How water becomes wine – Thoughts on Raymond Tallis’s book Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis and the Misrepresentation of Humanity

We use the brain as an adjunct to our life, as a highly sophisticated tool to facilitate our actions. However, do the functions of the brain alone amply explain the whole of the human condition?

When I throw a ball to someone else, I show the unfailing workings of a natural law. That however does not mean that I represent that law of physics, let alone become an embodiment of that law. Similarly, when a particular set of neurons in my brain gave rise to my intention to throw that ball, those neurons were merely involved in a physiological activity underlying that intention. That does not mean that this particular of set of neurons is the intention itself.
My MP3 player tells me that exceeding a certain volume level may harm my hearing in the long term. By indicating that this man-made device is “telling me” something, I use here language that anthropomorphises an artefact. I could have said instead that a warning message is displayed on the music player's screen. But I use the common lingua which is in tune with current thinking. It is a thinking that has influenced our technology and design so much that we not only humanize the actions of our tools and artefacts. We are also more comfortable with technology that resembles us humans and other familiar objects as much as possible. An example is the prevalence of skeuomorphism, the design of modern tools, devices and computer interfaces to closely resemble their older and accustomed predecessors. Apple’s iBook app for instance employed such a design concept until recently where the app’s bookshelf faithfully resembles a real-life one. In this app, you could build shelves for different collections and move books from one shelf to another. But, despite such uncanny realism, you are relocating only virtual books in a virtual bookshelf. It is not the same as handling a real book in a real bookshelf.
It appears that in such situations we may be mistaking the medium for the message. Raymond Tallis, in his book Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis and the Misrepresentation of Humanity suspects that materialist theories of the brain and consciousness – particularly the computational theory of the mind – may be prone to this error by mistaking the physical brain for the whole of consciousness. 
Frans Hals, Two Singing Boys, 1625
We use the brain as an adjunct to our life, as a highly sophisticated tool to facilitate our actions. There is no doubt a strong link between our brains and all our actions, physical and mental. Moreover, we will also undeniably lose our concept of self (or at least a part of it) if our brain shuts down or a part of it is clinically damaged. Oliver Sack discusses, for instance, the case of a patient with anosagnosia where his awareness of one of his legs had been completely obliterated. On clinical examination, it was found that this had been triggered by a vascular tumour overlying the right parietal lobe of the patient’s brain. [i]
However, do the functions of the brain alone amply explain the whole of the human condition? How does this functional view explain how “as high-born creatures of intellect and volition, we battle the indignities of flesh and death,” as Saint Augustine of Hippo was supposed to have pondered.[ii]  Cognitive researchers and thinkers have conflated the engineering definition of information with consciousness by removing the human element. This began with a description of the neuron as far back as the 1940s as not just the basic anatomical unit of the nervous system but “the basic information-processing unit”.[iii] Tallis objects to such a view of the mind as an information processing device – a central tenet of the computational theory of the mind – as a strange and contradictory move of dehumanising perception and anthropomorphising the organs of perception. As Warren Weaver pointed out, “information must not be confused with meaning. In fact, two messages, one of which is heavily loaded with meaning and the other of which is pure nonsense, can be exactly equivalent… as regards information.”[iv] John Searle appears cognisant of this subtlety when proposing a more balanced definition of consciousness by taking into account both the physiological and other (spiritual?) aspects of our actions. Taking the simple example of how a person decides to lift his hand and how the hand goes up, Searle contends that “one and the same event has a level of description where it's neurobiological, and another level of description where it's mental… that's how nature works. That's how it's possible for consciousness to function causally”.[v]
In his book, Tallis also contends that material objects – for example, our neurons – alone cannot explain consciousness. This is because it is hard to pin down which part of neural activity does consciousness reside in and is associated with subjective experience. Nerve impulses neither possess nor do they give rise to qualia. The properties we ascribe to them are observer-dependent. There is hence no consciousness without the observer. Tallis argues that human consciousness has evolved beyond its biological origins and we have over the years been “weaving a collective space on which we each have our own individual take.”[vi] As Tallis explains, “trying to discover… our ordinary Wednesdays in the tropisms of the evolved organism as reflected in brain activity is like applying one’s ear to a seed and expecting to hear the rustling of the wood in a breeze.”[vii] Biologism – trying to explain everything about the human condition within an evolutionary framework - is incomplete and incorrect. Biologism expresses “the bedrock (fallacious) assumption that if two evolving processes [for example, homo sapiens and our common primate ancestor] have a common origin they cannot end up any different from one another, from which it follows that the shopper reaching for a can of beans is… moved by the same forces as the chimp reaching out for a banana.” [viii]
The current state of science cannot claim to explain completely and satisfactorily how “the water of the physical brain is turned into the wine of consciousness” as Colin McGinn wondered.[ix] Until this mystery remains unanswered, it is churlish to decry other attempts to explain the mind and consciousness in terms that differ from a functional/materialist view of the world. It is also too premature to deny or dismiss concepts such as free will, self and personal identity merely as man's futile attempt to either present himself as an entity in the image of god or to ameliorate some kind of existential darkness.






[i] In Oliver Sacks, “A Leg to Stand On”, Picador, 1991, p: 55.
[ii] In Miles Hollingworth’s biography of St Augustine, reviewed in “The Australian Finance Review”, 25 October 2013.
[iii] In ““Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis and the Misrepresentation of Humanity” by Raymond Tallis, Acumen, 2012, p: 201.

[iv] Ibid, 200.
[v] http://www.ted.com/talks/john_searle_our_shared_condition_consciousness.html
[vi] Ibid, p: 237.
[vii] Ibid, p: 237.
[viii] Ibid, p: 153.
[ix] In Humphrey, Nicholas (2012-08-25). A History of the Mind: Evolution and the Birth of Consciousness (Kindle Locations 272-273). Kindle Edition.

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