The banality of goodness
By being too distant and dispassionate could our writers, judges, social theorists and others in the public space be accused of not bestowing requisite warmth and empathy in their actions and pronouncements? Is it in other words proper to apply the above praxis of detachment in all human encounters that call for the use of both judgement and empathy and compassion?
The defendant is one of six
accused of not having gone to the aid of several hundred women prisoners locked
into a church that was later bombed by the Allies. All defendants were women
guards at a Nazi satellite concentration camp near Auschwitz.
Photo: Edward Onslow Ford, Justice, partie d'un monument au maharajah de Mysore |
This is a scene, as some
may have guessed, from Bernard Schlink’s novel, The Reader. The
judge’s action is may be not so uncommon: it is akin to a doctor trying to maintain a veil of dispassion while
the most objective and informed decision possible on the disease’s prognosis. Nevertheless, the court's response sounds cold, callous, lacking in empathy. Does a judge
making life and death decisions need to take refuge behind aloof and
unemotional legalese in dealing with a very human question?
In another scene from The Reader, the narrator thinks that a
book containing the story of one of the prisoners who escaped from the church
horror possesses a certain numbness and distance. “It never gives [the guards]
clear enough faces or shapes for the reader to be able to relate to them, to
judge their acts for better or worse.” One perceives similar measured distance
in a number of other accounts too - both fiction and non-fiction - of comparable
horror and evil. A classic instance is the set of Primo Levi books presenting quite
non-emotive accounts of the chilling reality of life and death in a lager. This
clinical remoteness is manifest also in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s novels about
the gulag. Moreover, some of his writing is imbued too with so much humor and lightness: this is
particularly evident in his Cancer Ward,
whose main subject matter is how someone deals with the twin scourges of
oppression and disease.)
It appears that we are at
times compelled to use such considered reserve when trying to adequately
describe acute emotions and events which may be beyond the pale of day to day
experience. It is as if we fear that we could get burnt if we got too close to these
recollections of cruelty, dismay and inhumanity. We could consequently have to
relive the suffering and be unable to properly bear witness, to tell others
about it or to act as a judge who needs to remain unbiased lest the rest of
humanity also gets sucked into the vortex of evil.
By being too distant and dispassionate
could our writers, judges, social theorists and others in the public space be
accused of not bestowing requisite warmth and empathy in their actions and
pronouncements? Is it in other words proper to apply the above praxis of
detachment in all human encounters that
call for the use of both judgement and empathy and compassion? Marilynne
Robinson, Pulitzer Prize winning novelist and essayist, seems to support this view
when she bemoans (in her non-fiction work Absence
of Mind: The Dispelling Inwardness from the Modern Myth of the Self) the
lack of human warmth that goes missing when we deal with existential and
sociological questions. She cites in this context the theories of Malthus and
Darwin and their analysis and conclusions about political economy and
evolution. Their approach, Robinson contends, by being too academic and remote “puts
compassion or conscience out of play — two of the most potent and engrossing
individual experiences.”
Time for us to reveal our human face a bit more?
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